The Vernam cipher (or one-time pad) has played an important rule in cryptography because it is a perfect secrecy system. In particular, it is shown that, in a certain sense, the Vernam cipher is robust to small deviations from randomness.
Introduction
We consider the classical problem of transmitting secret messages from Alice (a sender) to Bob (a receiver) via an open channel which can be accessed by Eve (an adversary). It is supposed that Alice and Bob (and nobody else) know a so-called key K which is a word in a certain alphabet. Before transmitting a message Alice encrypts it. In his turn, Bob, after having received the encrypted message (ciphertext), decrypts it to recover the initial text (plaintext).
We consider so-called running-key ciphers where the plaintext X 1 ...X t , the key sequence Y 1 ...Y t and ciphertext Z 1 ...Z t belong to one alphabet A (without loss of generality we suppose that A = {0, 1, ..., n − 1}, where n ≥ 2. The i − th letter of the ciphertext is defined by Z i = c(X i , Y i ), i = 1, ..., t, whereas the deciphering rule is by X i = d(Z i , Y i ), i = 1, ..., t, i.e. d(e(X i , Y i ), Y i ) = X i .
Here c and d are functions called coder and decoder, correspondingly. Quite often the following particular formula are used
i.e. c(
In a case of two-letter alphabet (1) can be presented as follows:
where
It is important to note that we consider a so-called unconditional (or informationtheoretical) security. That is, the cipher is secure even when Eve has unlimited computing power. Roughly speaking, if the unconditionally secure cipher is used, Eve has many highly probable possible versions of a plaintext and, hence, cannot choose the real plaintext from them. The following informal consideration helps to understand the main idea of an approach considered later:
Let there be two unconditionally secure ciphers which can be applied to one plaintext. Imagine, that for the first cipher Eve has 10 equiprobable possible deciphering texts whose overall probability equals 0.999, whereas for the second cipher there are 100 equiprobable deciphering texts with the same overall probability. Obviously, the second system is more preferable, because the uncertainty of Eve is much larger for the second system. This informal consideration is quite popular in cryptography [6, 7, 9] and we will estimate the security of a cipher by the logarithm of the total number of (almost) equiprobable possible deciphering texts whose overall probability is close to 1.
The running-key cipher (1) is called the Vernam cipher (or one-time pad) if any word k 1 ...k t , k i ∈ A, is used as the key word with probability n −t , i.e.
In other words, we can say that the key letters are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) and probabilities of all letters are equal.
The Vernam cipher is one of the most popular among the unconditionally secure running-key ciphers. It has played an important rule in cryptography, especially since C.Shannon proved that this cipher is perfectly secure [9] . That is, the ciphertext Z 1 ...Z t gives absolutely no additional information about the plaintext X 1 ...X t . This fact can be interpreted as follows: a priori probability of a plaintext is the same as a posteriori probability of a plaintext given the corresponding ciphertext [9] . Using Shannon entropy, it can be expressed by
, where h(X 1 ...X t ) and In this paper we consider this problem for running-key ciphers (1) in a case where the plaintext X 1 ...X t and the key sequence Y 1 ...Y t are independently generated by stationary ergodic sources and the entropy of the key can be less than maximally possible value log n per letter (here and below log ≡ log 2 ).
The goal of the paper is to find simple estimates of secrecy for such systems.
We would like to emphasize that the unconditional secrecy is meant, i.e. it is supposed that Eve has unlimited computational power and unlimited time for computations.
It is worth noting that Shannon in his famous paper [9] mentioned that the problem of deciphering of a ciphertext and the problem of signal denoising are very close from mathematical point of view. In this paper we use some results obtained in [8] considering the problem of denoising.
Preliminaries
We consider the case where the plaintext X = X 1 , X 2 , . . . and and the key sequence Y 1 , Y 2 , . . . are independently generated by stationary ergodic processes with the finite alphabets A = {0, 1, ..., n − 1}, n ≥ 2.
The m−order Shannon entropy and the limit Shannon entropy are defined as follows:
where m ≥ 0 , P X (u) is the probability that X 1 X 2 ...X |u| = u (this limit always exists, see, for ex., [2, 3] ). Introduce also the conditional Shannon entropy
The Shannon-McMillan-Breiman theorem for conditional entropies can be stated as follows.
The proof can be found in [2, 3] . 
Proof. According to Shannon-McMillan-Breiman theorem for any ε > 0, δ > 0 and almost all Z 1 , Z 2 , . . . there exists such n ′ that for t > n
Let us define
The first property i) immediately follows from (6) . In order to prove ii), note that for any
t from Ψ(Z) we obtain from (6), (7)
From (7) and the property i) we obtain the following:
Taking into account that it is valid for any ε > 0, δ > 0 and t > n ′ , we obtain iii).
So, we can see that the set of possible decipherings Ψ(Z) grows exponentially, its total probability is close to 1 and probabilities of words from this set are close to each other.
Theorem 2 gives a possibility to estimate an uncertainty of a cipher based on the conditional entropy h(X|Z). Sometimes it can be difficult to calculate this value because it requires knowledge of the conditional probabilities. In this case the following simpler estimate can be useful.
Proof. From the well-known in Information Theory equation h(X, Z) = h(X) + h(Z|X) (see [2, 3] ) we obtain the following:
Having taken into account that max h(Z) = log n ( [2, 3] ), where n is the number of alphabet letters, we can derive from the latest equation that h(X|Z) ≥ h(Z|X) + h(X) − log n. The definition of the running-key cipher (1) shows that h(Z|X) = h(Y ). Taking into account two latest inequalities and the third statement iii) of Theorem 2 we obtain the statement of the corollary.
Comment. In Information Theory the difference between maximal value of the entropy and real one quite often is called the redundancy. Hence, from the corollary we have new following presentations for the value 1 t log |Ψ(Z)|:
where r Y = log n − h(Y ) and r X = log n − h(X) are the corresponding redundancies.
Those inequalities confirm the well-known in cryptography and Information
Theory fact that reduction of the redundancy improves the safety of ciphers.
Let us return to the first question of this note about the Vernam cipher with a biased key sequence. More precisely, let there be a plaintext X 1 X 2 ..., and we obtain the Vernam cipher. So, we can informally say that the Vernam cipher is robust to small deviations from randomness.
